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I.
Professor Epstein's critique centers around a conflict between the
"moral certainty" behind civil rights laws and doubts about their
economic efficacy.' It is a critique that would not impress Ms. Rosa
Parks. After all, the back of a bus is only a few feet from the front. It
arrives at the same time and performs the same function of deliver-
ing the worker to thejob. Why then should Ms. Parks have put her-
self and her neighbors to the expense and discomfort involved in
the Montgomery boycott of 1955? Only, according to Epstein, if she
was challenging the combination of bigotry and the coercive power
of the state. If she was challenging private custom standing alone,
she was in error because market forces would make private discrimi-
nation unimportant. Epstein's distinction is illusory. The state was
implicated in the bus operation. Legislation that granted limited lia-
bility and permitted concentration of capital cut off the personal re-
sponsibility the common law recognized. The power of the state to
grant immunity from personal liability is implicated in every corpo-
rate transaction. Our "free market" is a creature of this exercise of
state power.2
Professor Epstein's critique of the civil rights laws fails on the two
points made in the preceding paragraph. He does not recognize
interests in personal dignity, and therefore cannot perceive the civil
rights laws as precisely what they are called, "rights" laws.3 Rather,
he treats them as welfare laws, and faults them for not protecting
the weak. Second, he does not recognize that all transactions in the
corporate form involve an exercise of the power of the state, and
therefore are subject to the political process. These constraints may
1. This comment responds to Epstein, The Paradox of Civil Rights, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 299 (1990), [hereafter Paradox], which is in part a comment on my article, Society in
Transition I: A Broader Congressional Agenda For Equal Employment-The Peace Dividend, Leap
Frogging and Other Matters, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 257 (1990)
2. This analysis puts to one side the licensing of the bus company to use public
streets, the law or custom that forced Ms. Parks to the back of the bus, and common and
constitutional law that permitted that practice.
3. His exceptions for "force or fraud," unless carefully confined, could encompass as
much discrimination as was reached by Chief Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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call at one time for freedom of contract, and at another for restric-
tions on the abuses of such freedom. It is the function of the polit-
ical process to make those judgement calls. That process,
incidentally, comes closest to his professed principle of treating
every person as of equal value.
By looking at the Civil Rights Act as if it were an exercise in wel-
fare economics, he misses the point that Rosa Parks understood.
The perspective of the Civil Rights Acts is not that of welfare. It is
far more conservative than a quest for an increased share of national
income for a particular segment of society. It remains a quest for
individual and collective dignity-concepts Epstein has difficulty in
converting to dollars. He shares this difficulty with most econo-
mists. That is why they prefer to look at income as the primary mea-
sure of minority advancement and at money income in general as
the measure of social welfare.
Without denigrating this approach, my preference is to look at
minority occupational distribution in comparison to that of the
white labor force. That preference is based on the premise that dig-
nity in our time and society for both individuals and groups is heav-
ily influenced by occupational position. We are an employee
society. As long as most minorities were labor and service workers,
dignity did not flow to either individuals or the group. This diver-
gence in emphasis means that Heckman and Verkerke, whose work I
admire, can say that "black economic progress" stopped in mid
1970's, by focusing on incomes, 4 while I can say that it continued
through the 1980's, by focussing on occupational distribution. My
analysis does not assume that black incomes are identical to white
incomes in each wage category, as Epstein suggests, because data
exists from which the inferior black wage structure can be identified.
Using this data, I observed that, for the year 1980 alone, the net
increase in minority wages was nearly $9 billion, taking into account
majority/minority wage differences, over the income that would
have gone to minorities under the occupational distribution of
1965. 5
4. Heckman and Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Discrimination Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 276, (1990), [hereafter Racial Disparity].
5. Blumrosen, The Law Transmission System & The SouthernJurisprudence of Employment
Discrimination, 6 Indus. ReL L.J. 313, 333-338 (1984).
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Professor Epstein insists on preserving white advantage in the
name of welfare economics precisely because he does not value dig-
nitary interests. He assumes that Whites have no interest in the dig-
nity accorded to Blacks.6 But the Civil Rights Acts reflect idealistic
and practical considerations behind the importance that Whites at-
tach to black dignity, considerations that required an improvement
in minority status. 7
His other point is that anti-discrimination laws have not func-
tioned as welfare laws, benefiting the poorest. Rather, they have
benefited the better prepared, "leaving those at the bottom to fend
for themselves in the welfare system and the unemployment rolls. '"
Once again, the concept of dignity has eluded him. The patterns of
discrimination discounted the talented as well as the non-talented;
therefore the Civil Rights Act protects both. Of course, Title VII
has not benefited the poorest and least prepared among the minor-
ity labor force. Employers have never been required to hire unqual-
ified workers, as measured by non-discriminatory standards. We
have not attempted to place on employers all the costs of inade-
quate schooling and atrocious social conditions. Title VII is far
more market-oriented than that; it does allow the employer to
"cream" the minority labor force just as it may cream the white la-
bor force.
The function of Equal Employment Opportunity laws has
changed since 1964. The initial function was to break down the dis-
criminatory barriers that were either overt or implicit in so called
neutral standards. The second function then was to institutionalize
fair employment practice programs within large employers. This
was successfully done, largely through the Executive Order pro-
gram, in the 1970s. These fair employment practices continued to
operate in the face of the opposition of the Reagan administration.
The function of the civil rights law now is to enforce commonly ac-
cepted standards of reasonable behavior on employers. In this
6. Paradox, supra note 1 at 305.
7. "It has been said that the bill [the Civil Rights Act of 1964] discriminates in favor
of the Negro at the expense of the rest of us. It seeks to do nothing more than to lift the
Negro from the status of inequality to one of equality of treatment. To the extent that
this deprives any of the rest of us of anything, it is intended to deprive us of the power to
treat him as a lesser and unequal American. Such a power is not ours as of right, either
as Americans or as children of God." Senator Muskie, at the close of the debate on the
Civil Rights Act, 110 CONG. REC. 14,328 (1964).




light, the drive of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 toward con-
ventional tort remedies can be better understood.9
The fact of the matter is that we have a black labor force that has a
relatively affluent component because of the very civil rights law to
which Professor Epstein objects. All he says about that is that the
issue of the role of the civil rights laws is unproved. ' 0 On this issue,
the Heckman and Verkerke article is most useful. It grapples with
the difficult question of "social causation"-of developing a connec-
tion between the civil rights laws and improved economic conditions
of minorities."I I think that Heckman and Verkerke are more wor-
ried than necessary about the proof process involved in the choice
between "continuous change," which credits general economic con-
ditions, and "discontinuous", which credits federal EEO law. The
opponents of the view that the law was a significant contributor to
the change cannot meet a burden of persuasion which arises from
the combination of the timing of improvement in minority employ-
ment and Heckman and Payner's specific study of the South Caro-
lina textile and apparel industry, which effectively refuted
alternative explanations.' 2
When Heckman and Verkerke say, "only evidence concerning the
effects of specific policies can guide policy formulation"'13 they may
unduly deny utility to economists' insights. Specific legal programs
almost always work in conjunction not only with one another, but
with a wide constellation of other events and activities, thus defying
separate analysis. Legal, economic and social systems cannot be
separated in assessing a legislative program that would not have
been adopted unless a significant portion of society was prepared to
accept it. Therefore, it is not possible to separate out the effect of
the law from the sentiment that led to its adoption. The question is
what to do in the absence of the kind of precision that they would
prefer. The answer may lie in the cumulation of individually identi-
fied experiences. In the days before "anecdotal" evidence was con-
sidered inferior, experience was said to be a useful mentor. Where
statistics will not help, we may be forced to rely on experience once
again.
9. I agree with Heckman and Verkerke that future minority advances will depend
more on factors beyond the immediate control of the employer, and hence beyond the
reach of Title VII.
10. Paradox, supra note 1, at 301.
11. Racial Disparity, supra note 6, at 286-90.
12. Heckman & Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Poliy on the
Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 A. EcoN. REV. 138 (1989).
13. Racial Disparity supra note 6, at 291.
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And this leads to the most interesting aspect of Professor Ep-
stein's criticism of my article-his objection to my "mischievous"
encouragement of the civil rights movement to meddle in areas they
have traditionally left alone. Prof. Epstein might have been pleased
that I recognized that there are economic forces beyond the control
of individual employers that limit the capacity of Title VII to im-
prove opportunities for minorities and women. But I get no credit
for this insight, because I then suggest that the civil rights move-
ment might try to influence these forces. Professor Epstein's objec-
tions are predictable. The market will be interfered with,
distributional gains will be nullified, political bitterness will occur.
He argues we should not "court political turmoil in order to retard
economic development."' 4 This, of course, is a most political
statement.
In the end, there is no paradox of civil rights. Those with newly
recognized rights always press those rights to their limits. Society,
partly through the legal system, will struggle to identify those limits.
In retrospect, the concerns about affirmative action, reverse discrim-
ination and productivity will be viewed as part of the process of ad-
aptation of claims to equality within our legal, economic and social
arrangements. What has been lost is the apparent security of settled
conditions in which minorities and women knew their place. In ex-
change, we have an era of uncertainty, which is a vast improvement
over the old stability and may lead to the convergence of the inter-
ests of the civil rights movement with the concerns of the less afflu-
ent members of society.
Alfred W Blumrosen
II.
Richard Epstein presents a thoughtful libertarian perspective on
our article. He raises three points. First, he questions our use of
black relative wages as a measure of the success of civil rights poli-
cies and suggests that "social welfare" should guide policy in this
area.' 5 Second, he asks what lessons can be drawn from our article
14. Paradox, supra note 1, at 319.




concerning the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990. On this ques-
tion, he accepts our main conclusions-that civil rights legislation
helped raise black relative wages in the period 1965 to 1975 and
that the successes of this era have little relevance for the policy dis-
cussions of 1990. Third, Epstein claims that the observed improve-
ment in black relative status resulted from "the effective elimination
of force and fraud."' 6 In his view, racial disparity can be sustained
only when active government policy impedes voluntary market
forces or when private, illegal, coercive activity impairs individual
freedom of association and contract.
Before we consider these substantive issues, a methodological
comment is in order. Epstein correctly notes that we are cautious in
generalizing from the available facts. In this regard, our style is dif-
ferent from that of many scholars writing on law and economics who
assume that theoretical predictions about the impact of the law have
a precise counterpart in reality. Our approach is expressly empirical
and our caution is deliberate. On a topic as controversial as the im-
pact of civil rights legislation, it is especially important to distin-
guish fact from fantasy. We will make progress in law and
economics only if we clearly separate fact from speculative theory
and do not assume that qualitatively correct conclusions are neces-
sarily quantitatively important. Our article presents the available
empirical facts that should be the basis for an informed discussion of
employment discrimination legislation. It is important to know how
much discipline the available factual knowledge imposes on specula-
tive social science theory. Our unwillingness to speculate does not
betray a lack of imagination; rather, it indicates our desire to focus
on what objectively can be known.' 7
16. Id. at 310.
17. In his rejoinder to our response, Epstein criticizes us for "provid[ing] no way in
which to assess the incentive effects or the administrative costs of the current program of
Civil Rights enforcement." Epstein, Postscript, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 331 (1990).
Although we share Epstein's eagerness to analyze these economic aspects of employ-
ment discrimination law, the express purpose of our article is to assess the available
empirical evidence on the effects of the law. We differ from Epstein principally in our
willingness to substitute theoretical speculation for empirical analysis of these questions.
Informed speculation may be the only availabe guide to policy formation, but we believe
that it is critically important to distinguish between convincing empirical evidence and
untested assertions about the supposed economic effects of the law. Epstein's conten-
tion that the Civil Rights Act of 1990 will "expand the dislocations in the economy with-
out any discernible payoff" falls into the latter category. Id.
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Measures of Black Progress and Social Welfare
We agree with Epstein that using relative wages to measure black
status is arbitrary. It has become a conventional measure in the eco-
nomic analysis of discrimination because of the influential work of
Gary Becker, who developed a demand-side theory of market dis-
crimination in which relative wages play a prominent role.18 Alter-
native models suggest different rfieasures.' 9
For example, black and white real income or earnings levels can
be compared over time. In the 1950s, both black and white male
real earnings rose while the earnings ratio remained fixed. During
the 1960s and early 1970s, although black relative earnings rose, the
absolute gap between the real earnings of blacks and whites in-
creased. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, black relative earnings
remained constant while real earnings for both racial groups de-
clined. The absolute declines for both racial groups do not appear
to be related in any systematic way to developments in civil rights
law. The data for the period 1965 to 1975, during which black rela-
tive status improved while white absolute earnings rose, refute Ep-
stein's conjecture that civil rights laws might have improved black
relative status by reducing white absolute status. 20
We agree with Epstein that it would be interesting to know if soci-
ety is better off with Title VII than without it. However, in this con-
text, -social welfare is an empirically meaningless concept. Epstein
proposes to evaluate the success of civil rights legislation using the
conventional Pareto and Hicks-Kaldor criteria.2 1 It is patently obvi-
ous that Title VII was not Pareto improving. Many white
southerners resented federal interference with their way of life, and
white workers stood to lose their privileged position in the labor
market. The factual knowledge required to compute Kaldor-Hicks
compensation measures is simply not available. As is often the case,
the lack of necessary data makes welfare economics an academic cu-
riosity of no practical value in evaluating social programs. 22
18. G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957).
19. See Heckman, The Impact of Government on the Economic Status of Black Americans, in
THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET
(1989).
20. Paradox, supra note 1.
21. Id. at 303-9.
22. In his rejoinder, Epstein clarifies his proposed application of the Pareto welfare
criterion. We understand his position to be that civil rights laws are justified if they
promote the libertarian ideal of voluntary association or if they produce a Pareto im-
provement from the libertarian regime. Postscript supra note 19, at 332. The traditional




Even if social welfare could be evaluated, it would convey little
useful information. No one seriously maintains that social policy is
based on maximizing social welfare in either its Benthamite or Rawl-
sian form. A more realistic model of governmental decision making
emphasizes rivalry among groups.23 In this view, politically success-
ful groups use the tax-transfer system to achieve essentially redis-
tributive goals, incurring real resource costs in the process.
Discussion of optimal social policy requires both the selection of so-
cial choice mechanisms and knowledge of the full costs of decisions
made under those mechanisms. Agreement concerning ethical and
economic criteria also would be required to evaluate optimal social
policies.
Our ambition is more modest. The indices of welfare we use in
this and other articles measure the economic gains for Blacks-the
group for which employment discrimination laws were enacted.
While some benefits can be identified, there are no convincing em-
pirical estimates of the costs of civil rights legislation to employers
and nonminorities. We do not deny that such costs exist or that
they are relevant to social decisions about antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. In the spirit of our cautious approach, however we simply note
the absence of any empirical evidence concerning their magnitude
or practical importance.
Lessons for the Civil Rights Act of 1990
As stated in our article and reiterated by Epstein in his critique,
the breakdown of discrimination in the South in the period 1965 to
1975 was a unique historical episode. First and foremost, the bla-
tantly discriminatory employment practices of the segregated South
were an easy target for antidiscrimination enforcement. Second, the
desire of entrepreneurs to employ Blacks in their factories contrib-
uted significantly to the successes of the first decade of federal em-
ployment discrimination law.2 4 The market-enhancing characteristic
make at least one person better off without making anyone worse off-relative to the status
quo. If the traditional approach based on a comparison to an observable wealth distribu-
tion is empirically meaningless, then Epstein's approach-based on a comparison to a
hypothetical distribution-is even less tenable.
23. See Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98
O.J. EcON. 371 (1983).
24. See Donohue & Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact ofAffirative
Action and Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES (forth-
coming 1990); Heckman & Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy
on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. EcON. REV. 138 (1989); see
also Butler, Heckman & Payner, The Impact of the Economy and the State on the Economic Status
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of the legislation helps to explain why the gains for Blacks were so
great during a period when enforcement activity was so limited. It is
unlikely that such market-enhancing opportunities for civil rights
law exist today. Moreover, the remaining targets for employment
discrimination enforcement are far more subtle and ambiguous than
the strict labor market segregation that prevailed in 1964. Accord-
ingly, the civil rights success in the South of the 1960s has little rele-
vance to current legal controversies concerning employment
discrimination legislation.
Why Was Discrimination Maintained?
Epstein contends that "segregation retained its tenacity because it
was a set of big government practices that exhibited all the excesses
that only government monopolies can work."'25 However, he fails to
establish the role of state governments in maintaining patterns of
discrimination and segregation in employment. Only South Caro-
lina had a law mandating segregation in employment, and it was
confined to the textile and apparel industries. Yet similar patterns
of racial exclusion prevailed in the textile industry in Virginia, North
Carolina and Georgia, which lacked segregation laws. The break-
through of Black employment observed in South Carolina textiles
after 1965 also occurs in the textile industry in those states.26 The
South Carolina segregation law, enacted in 1915, merely ratified
pre-existing practices. In fact, Black employment rose as a percent
of total employment after passage of the 1915 law.
The stability of segregated employment patterns in the absence of
any direct governmental action suggests that factors other than gov-
ernmental coercion explain the persistence of discrimination. Little
direct evidence is available concerning the mechanisms that sup-
ported segregation. We can, like Epstein, only speculate about the
reasons that segregated employment patterns persisted until 1965.
The southern system of racial subordination undoubtedly
originated in the violence of slavery. Private violence continued to
play a role, particularly in rural areas of the South. Another reason
for stability was the widely shared belief that Blacks were inferior to
Whites and that by virtue of their inferiority Blacks belonged in a
of Blacks, in MARKETS IN HISTORY: EcoNoMIc STUDIES OF THE PAST 240 (D. Galenson, ed.
1989).
25. Paradox, supra note 1, at 309.




subordinate position in southern society.27 Although social scien-
tists have great difficulty in accommodating shared beliefs into their
theories,2 8 such beliefs may play an important role in accounting for
many social phenomena.
In addition to speculating on the role of government in maintain-
ing segregated employment patterns, Epstein presents an idealized
and undocumented account of the operation of competitive mar-
kets. His claim that the entry of color-blind entrepreneurs would
eliminate discriminatory hiring is not factually based. This is pure
speculation. A different line of speculation envisions that employers
confront social sanctions if they deviate from prevailing segrega-
tionist practices. The resulting market equilibrium can be robust to
individual entrepreneurial deviations from the segregationist
norm.29 Even without social sanctions for deviance, firms still may
incur sizable costs in attempting to employ Blacks. White employ-
ees' resistance to working with Blacks may make an integrated
workforce impossible to maintain. Substantial fixed costs of em-
ployment make it costly to replace an all-white work force with an
all-black one. Even if violence and coercive social pressures play no
role, institutionalized segregation and discrimination may be costly
for a solitary entrepreneur to change.
Epstein also neglects a potentially important role for interaction
between discrimination in employment and discrimination in other
aspects of southern life. For some industries, integration in the
workplace entailed integration in schools and housing. Many south-
ern textile plants were geographically isolated; schools, housing,
and employment in the mill towns were all segregated. A marginal
firm experimenting with hiring Blacks may fail to become profitable
unless the government promotes the integration of other aspects of
social, political and economic life.30 Donohue and Heckman docu-
ment that the success of Title VII in the South in the period 1965 to
27. In the early 1900s, accounts in scholarly publications describe Blacks as limited
or inferior in comparison to Whites. The "sciences" of anthropology and phrenology
clearly established this "fact." See A.B. HART, THE SOUTHERN SOUTH (1910).
28. SeeJ. ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1989).
29. For a theoretical development of such a model, see Akerlof, A Theory of Social
Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, 94 QJ.. EcoN. 749 (1980).
30. In his rejoinder, Epstein contends that it is an historical error to believe that the
southern segregationist system could have been maintained without the "coercive prop"
of state power. Postscript supra note 19, at 331. Although segregation was certainly rein-
forced by the white monopoly on political power, it is a non sequitur to infer that political
power was necessary to maintain labor market segregation. The fragmentary evidence
availabe for the period before South Carolina enacted laws regulating the employment
of blacks in the textile industry shows that black employment was low and that experi-
ments with employing black workers were unsuccessful.
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1975 was closely tied to successful programs of integration in
schooling, housing and voting.3' Heckman and Payner observe that
simultaneous federal pressure on several aspects of the segregation-
ist system produced important spillovers in other sectors of south-
ern society.3 2 Entrepreneurial experimentation was both infrequent
and unsuccessful. Evidence from South Carolina before the advent of
Jim Crow laws suggests that attempts by individual entrepreneurs to
employ all-Black workforces in textiles led to financial failure in
every instance. The reasons for failure are unclear.33 Nonetheless, a
central tenet of libertarian thought-that unfettered competition
eliminates discrimination-remains to be empirically verified.3 4
JamesJ. Heckman andJ. Hoult Verkerke
31. Donohue & Heckman, supra note 9.
32. Heckman & Payner, supra note 9.
33. See B. MITCHELL, THE RISE OF THE COTTON MILLS IN THE SOUTH (1921); G.
Wright, Segregation and Racial Wage Differentials in the South Before World War II
10-13 (Stanford University 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
34. In his rejoinder, Epstein restates the libertarian position that "the forms of dis-
crimination that remain in voluntary markets are not worthy of elimination by state coer-
cion." Postscript, supra note 19, at 331. Although we appreciate the clarification, this
normative position is somewhat at odds with Epstein's repeated assertion that competi-
tive pressure is sufficient to eliminate market discrimination in wages (as distinct from
eliminating market segregation). A system of segregated production without wage dis-
crimination is a theoretical possibility, but the available empirical evidence strongly sug-
gests that racial segregation and racial discrimination most often occur together. There
was very little pure wage discrimination in the South even prior to 1964. Instead, Blacks
were excluded from relatively higher paying industries and occupations. Thus, the his-
torical record offers no support for the theory of nondiscriminatory segregation.
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It is, I think, important to make few brief comments on the replies
to my paper by Heckman and Verkerke.1
Heckman and Verkerke despair of the ability to make any con-
structive social recommendations on the strength of either Pareto or
Kaldor-Hicks criteria. But they offer little by way of an analytical
substitute, and provide no way to assess the incentive effects or the
administrative costs of the current program of civil rights enforce-
ment. Their caution therefore makes them, as best one can tell, ag-
nostic about the Civil Rights Act of 1990, even though the statute
seems to expand the dislocations in the economy without any dis-
cernible social payoff. One certainly cannot attribute any normative
weight to the models of interest group politics, such as Gary
Becker's, 2 that describe all too well how American politics operates
today.
In addition, Heckman and Verkerke misconstrue the libertarian
position. It is not a central tenet of libertarian thought to believe, as
they claim, "that unfettered competition eliminates discrimina-
tion." 3 Affirmative action programs are powerful evidence that it
will not. And normatively, the libertarian position is that the forms
of discrimination that remain in voluntary markets are not worthy of
elimination by state coercion-a very different proposition indeed.
The argument favors decentralized decisionmaking, and not any
particular vision of the collective good.
Heckman and Verkerke also make, I belive, two mistakes in seek-
ing to understand the Jim Crow era, one historical and one analyti-
cal. Historically, it is exceedingly unlikely that the pattern of
segregation could have been maintained in the South if the segrega-
tionists did not maintain control of all organs of state and local gov-
ernment. The tenacity with which they resisted sharing the vote is
powerful evidence that maintenance of the coercive" power of the
state was necessary to support their vision of culture. Without iron-
clad white political control, someone, somewhere would have tried
to gain entry into local markets, given the supracompetitive returns.
1. Heckman & Verkerke, Responses to Epstein, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 320,324 (1990)
[hereinafter cited Response].
2. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983).
3. Response supra 1, at 330.
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To call this historical pattern of social and cultural practices is to
ignore or to understate the coercive prop 'on which the whole sys-
tem depended. Do Heckman and Verkerke believe that Jim Crow
could have survived if black majorities held political power?
Analytically, I think the Yale duo are wrong to insist that any
change from Jim Crow to an open economy must be a Pareto im-
provement to be justified.4 As I noted in my article, where strong
libertarian arguments against a current set of legal rules, then recti-
fication is in order, and rectification never leaves those who are re-
sponsible as well off afterwards as they were before. The question
of Pareto improvement must be asked from the accepted libertarian
baseline: can one think of a way in whichJim Crow is either a Pareto
or a Kaldor-Hicks improvement over a system of open and competi-
tive markets? As cautious as they are, I'll bet that neither Heckman
nor Verkerke would maintain that position if forced to abandon
their methodology modesty.
Richard A. Epstein
4. Id at 326.
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